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# EVIDENTIARY REPORT

*In Support of Four Proposed Articles of Impeachment*
*Against Donald J. Trump, President of the United States*

NINE CHARGES / FOUR ARTICLES / SOURCE-LINKED PUBLIC EDITION

Evidence period: January 20, 2025 to November 4, 2026

Cutoff and publication date: November 4, 2026

Companion instrument: Independently proposed Articles of Impeachment (not introduced in Congress)

Edition: Documentary compilation and legal issue analysis, version 1.0

## PURPOSE AND LIMITATIONS

This report collects the strongest available evidence supporting nine charges, records contrary arguments, and identifies unproven elements. “Completed” means the documentary report and its indexes are assembled—not that each allegation has been proved or adjudicated. Official findings of agency misconduct are not findings that the President committed an impeachable offense. This is not an official House report or a legal judgment.

Source keys [S01]–[S32] correspond to a fully linked source index. All dates are local U.S. dates unless stated otherwise.

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## EXECUTIVE SYNTHESIS

The proposed Articles concentrate on four categories: noncompliance with judicial orders and deficient due process; interference with congressionally appropriated funds and congressional war powers; retaliation against legal institutions and removal of inspectors general; and use of presidential status in connection with private financial ventures. Direct presidential instruments anchor several allegations; other sections depend on inferences from subordinate conduct or investigative reporting.

The strongest direct presidential links are Proclamation 10903 (§1.2), the relevant executive orders (§§2.1, 3.1), the February 25 Covington memorandum (§3.2), the inspector-general dismissals (§3.3), and presidential participation in a token-holder dinner (§4.1). The most important unproved elements are personal knowledge of the J.O.P. rulings (§1.1) and improper influence or personal receipt of benefits in the UAE-related transactions (§4.2).

### Meaning of evidence labels

| LABEL | MEANING | LIMITATION |
|---|---|---|
| ADJUDICATED | A court made the particular finding in a judicial order or opinion. | Not a conviction or a judicial finding that impeachment is warranted. |
| DOCUMENTED | Supported by an official instrument, congressional record, GAO decision, or reliably attributed reporting. | An official GAO decision is not a court judgment; published reporting may rely on unproduced records. |
| CONTESTED | Disputed inference, intent, attribution, or causal theory not established by the cited material. | Requires further documents, testimony, and adversarial examination. |

Labels apply to each discrete proposition. A single section can contain adjudicated findings, documented executive acts, and contested allegations. Reported financial details are marked DOCUMENTED—REPORTED, not judicially adjudicated.

# PART I / CONSTITUTIONAL METHOD AND STANDARDS

## 1. Selection of charges

Four Articles group nine separately numbered charges. The list is intentionally selective: it does not equate policy disagreement, ordinary administrative error, or every alleged legal violation with impeachable conduct. The Eric Adams prosecution matter was excluded from the charged items because the draft did not establish a specific presidential instruction or adequate knowledge-and-direction evidence. It is not an independent charge in this report.

## 2. Constitutional authority and historical practice

The House has the sole power of impeachment (U.S. Const. art. I, §2); the Senate has the sole power to try impeachments (art. I, §3); and removal for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is governed by art. II, §4. The Take Care Clause appears in art. II, §3. Impeachment is a constitutional judgment by Congress, not a substitute for criminal prosecution or civil adjudication.

The House Judiciary Committee's 1974 Nixon Article II, paragraph 4, invoked failure to act when the President "knew or had reason to know" that close subordinates were obstructing lawful inquiries. That supplies a historical pleading analogy, not a binding judicial test or a rule that all public reporting is imputed to the President. The Nixon allegation concerned close subordinates and demonstrated obstruction; §1.1 here must independently establish an analogous responsibility link. [S01]

## 3. Method and source hierarchy

Court holdings are described only to the extent decided; GAO findings are credited as GAO legal conclusions, not court rulings; congressional votes establish congressional positions, not necessarily enacted law; executive orders and memoranda demonstrate directions on their face, not necessarily unlawful motive; reporting about private transactions is attributed to its publishers and not converted into authenticated corporate records.

Where the relevant decision addresses a procedural issue only, this report does not represent it as a merits judgment. Where a legal instrument expressly conditions implementation on applicable law, that limiting language is included in the defense analysis.

# PART II / ARTICLE I — JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND DUE PROCESS

## § 1.1 Disregard of binding judicial orders

**CHARGE** President Trump knew or had reason to know of repeated noncompliance with orders in J.O.P. v. DHS but failed to secure compliance before an additional removal.

### Fact-by-fact evidence ledger

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| Court found federal defendants in civil contempt for removals contrary to prior settlement orders; July 29 opinion, publicly filed Aug. 6. | ADJUDICATED | [S02] |
| The opinion limited the contempt rationale to removals despite identification of potential class membership; it did not find every identification failure contemptuous. | ADJUDICATED | [S02] |
| Law360 publicly reported the contempt finding Aug. 6, 26 days before Sept. 1. | DOCUMENTED | [S03] |

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| E.L.A. was removed Sept. 1; Sept. 25 order found contempt of 2024, 2025, and July 2026 orders and required return. | ADJUDICATED | [S04] [S32] |
| Nov. 3 order extended jurisdiction to enforce settlement for wrongly removed class members through May 27, 2027. | ADJUDICATED | [S05] |
| President personally knew or had reason to know and failed to act despite notice. | CONTESTED | Inference; no direct White House notification in available record |

### Presidential responsibility and legal theory

The July contempt opinion documents a serious pattern and notice to the named agency defendants. Public coverage before the Sept. 1 violation strengthens the argument that the executive leadership had reason to know, but press publication does not prove presidential receipt or establish what corrective direction he personally gave. Nixon Article II(4) is a precedent for evaluating failure to act after notice, not a conclusive standard for presidential knowledge. [S01–S05]

### Principal counterarguments and legal limits

DHS may contend that E.L.A.'s later removal arose from miscommunication between USCIS and ICE rather than presidential defiance; the government reportedly made that explanation in the litigation. A court's civil-contempt finding does not identify Trump as the contemnor. The July opinion also declined some of plaintiffs' broader requested findings and relief.

### Records still needed

- White House/DHS briefings and distribution records for the August public opinion and September order.
- Communications among DHS, ICE, USCIS, White House Counsel, and senior immigration policy officers concerning compliance.
- Contemporaneous corrective guidance, audits, training, or operational instructions before Sept. 1.
- Unsealed September 25 order and any sealed memorandum portions legally available for public review.

**ASSESSMENT** Two judicial contempt findings and intervening public notice are supported. Actual presidential knowledge, attribution, and failure to supervise remain contested; no finding of presidential contempt exists.

**Principal sources** S01 · S02 · S03 · S04 · S05 · S32

## § 1.2 Denial of due process in immigration enforcement

**CHARGE** The President invoked extraordinary removal authority while federal removals and procedures failed to provide required legal safeguards.

### Fact-by-fact evidence ledger

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| Proclamation 10903 was signed Mar. 14, 2025, invoking the Alien Enemies Act for alleged TdA members. | DOCUMENTED | [S07] |
| The government acknowledged Abrego Garcia had been unlawfully sent to El Salvador through administrative error despite withholding-of-removal protection. | DOCUMENTED | [S06] |
| Supreme Court directed government to facilitate his release and address his case as though he had not been improperly removed; "effectuate" remedy required clarification. | ADJUDICATED | [S06] |

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| A.A.R.P. found roughly 24 hours of notice, without information to seek review, inadequate and granted interim relief. | ADJUDICATED | [S08] |
| President personally ordered unconstitutional procedures or knowingly approved individual unlawful removals. | CONTESTED | Implementation link not established |

### Presidential responsibility and legal theory

The signed proclamation is direct presidential action. The Supreme Court's A.A.R.P. holding concerns notice and interim jurisdictional protection, not a final holding that the proclamation itself was unlawful. The Abrego Garcia mistake is an acknowledged agency action; treating it as presidential intent requires an additional evidentiary link. [S06–S08]

### Principal counterarguments and legal limits

Government invokes national security, emergency removal authorities, and later remedial action. The Supreme Court in A.A.R.P. explicitly reserved the underlying merits and deferred the exact procedure due. In Abrego Garcia, the Court limited the government's obligation to facilitate, while noting foreign-affairs deference.

### Records still needed

- Original operational notices and AEA removal protocols used in April 2025.
- Instructions implementing Proclamation 10903; review of changes after the Court's order.
- Evidence of presidential review of specific notice practices or the Abrego Garcia removal.

**ASSESSMENT** The proclamation and specific procedural due-process deficiency are established. Personal direction of particular unlawful removals is not established.

**Principal sources** S06 · S07 · S08

# PART III / ARTICLE II — CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY

## § 2.1 Repeated unlawful withholding of congressional appropriations

**CHARGE** Executive restructuring and program directives foreseeably contributed to repeated impoundments that did not follow the Impoundment Control Act.

### Fact-by-fact evidence ledger

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| Trump signed EO 14210 (workforce optimization) Feb. 11 and EO 14238 (agency function reductions) Mar. 14. | DOCUMENTED | [S09] [S10] |
| GAO B-337375 concluded IMLS withheld funds contrary to the ICA after EO 14238 implementation. | DOCUMENTED | [S11] |
| GAO B-337203 concluded NIH withheld appropriated funds contrary to the ICA amid grant terminations and disrupted processing. | DOCUMENTED | [S12] |
| GAO B-337485 found EPA impounded Community Change Grant funds without special message; Oct. 7, 2026. | DOCUMENTED | [S13] |

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| GAO B-337872 found AHRQ/HHS withheld >$78 million without special message following loss of grant staff; Oct. 7, 2026. | DOCUMENTED | [S14] |
| President personally intended each ICA violation or directed unlawful withholding after notice. | CONTESTED | No comprehensive notice/directive chain established |

### Presidential responsibility and legal theory

Congress controls appropriations; the ICA prescribes procedures for presidential rescission or deferral proposals. EO 14238 provides a relatively direct causal connection to IMLS, and EO 14210 is expressly discussed in the AHRQ chronology. GAO called the AHRQ delays impoundment rather than ordinary programmatic delay, while noting discretion to spend within a lump-sum account. The decisions make agency ICA violations the documentary center of this charge, not automatically presidential intent. [S09–S14]

### Principal counterarguments and legal limits

Orders instruct compliance with law; appropriations often provide programmatic discretion, and agencies may lawfully prioritize or terminate individual grants. EPA's decision also discusses Congress's later rescission of certain unobligated balances; that later law does not retroactively erase the earlier GAO finding but limits present remedial claims. GAO decisions are not Article III judicial decisions or criminal findings.

### Records still needed

- OMB apportionment schedules, withholding instructions, and special-message records.
- Communications showing what President or senior White House officials were told about ICA obligations.
- Agency responses or changes after each GAO finding, and applicable later rescissions.
- Distinguish lump-sum reallocations from withholding of budget authority altogether.

**ASSESSMENT** Four GAO determinations and the principal executive orders are documented. Presidential direction of restructuring is established; intent to impound unlawfully remains an inference.

**Principal sources** S09 · S10 · S11 · S12 · S13 · S14

## § 2.2 Encroachment upon congressional war powers

**CHARGE** The President continued Iran hostilities without specific congressional authorization despite a bicameral concurrent resolution opposing their continuation.

### Fact-by-fact evidence ledger

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. and Israeli strikes began Feb. 28, 2026, followed by regional conflict and later ceasefire/renewed hostilities. | DOCUMENTED | [S18] |
| House adopted H. Con. Res. 86 June 3 by 215–208 (Roll 199). | DOCUMENTED | [S15] |
| Senate adopted same resolution June 23 by 50–48 (Roll 184); the enrolled text directs withdrawal subject to defenses and authorization. | DOCUMENTED | [S16] [S17] |
| CRS described April ceasefire, June memorandum of understanding, renewed strikes, and renewed limited operations by September. | DOCUMENTED | [S18] |

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| The concurrent resolution legally compelled withdrawal, and all post-vote operations necessarily violated the WPR. | CONTESTED | Chadha/presentment and timing questions |

### Presidential responsibility and legal theory

Presidential initiation and direction of military operations is attributable to the Commander in Chief. The 1973 War Powers Resolution contains a generally applicable 60-day termination framework, but assessing its operation requires each report date, defined period of "hostilities," ceasefire, and claimed authorization. H. Con. Res. 86 is an unusually clear expression of both chambers' opposition; it is not an enacted statute. [S15–S19]

### Principal counterarguments and legal limits

The Executive may rely on Article II defensive powers, asserted protection of allies and U.S. forces, the intermittent nature of engagements, and the concurrent resolution's disputed legal enforceability after INS v. Chadha. A resolution not presented to the President does not automatically have binding legislative force.

### Records still needed

- All February–November 2026 War Powers notifications and legal opinions.
- Day-by-day operations and hostilities chronology with ceasefire periods.
- Government's claimed statutory authorizations, if any, and responses to H. Con. Res. 86.
- Legal analysis of WPR §5(c) and the possible effect of INS v. Chadha.

**ASSESSMENT** The conflict, votes, and bicameral statement are documented. The precise statutory deadline and constitutional unlawfulness are contested issues, not adjudicated conclusions.

**Principal sources** S15 · S16 · S17 · S18 · S19

# PART IV / ARTICLE III — RETALIATORY EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

## § 3.1 Retaliatory executive orders against legal professionals

**CHARGE** President Trump directly issued orders penalizing firms because of representations or associations protected by constitutional guarantees.

### Fact-by-fact evidence ledger

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| Trump issued EO 14230 targeting Perkins Coie Mar. 6, 2025. | DOCUMENTED | [S20] |
| Judge Howell held EO 14230 unconstitutional and granted declaratory/permanent injunctive relief May 2, 2025. | ADJUDICATED | [S21] |
| Trump issued EO 14250 targeting WilmerHale Mar. 27, 2025. | DOCUMENTED | [S22] |
| Judge Leon found EO 14250 unconstitutional under First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments and enjoined it May 27, 2025. | ADJUDICATED | [S23] |
| Final appellate resolution of every claim has been established in this report. | CONTESTED | Appellate dockets not exhaustively audited |

### Presidential responsibility and legal theory

The presidential act is direct and the district court judgments are unusually strong evidence about the legal character of those instruments. The Perkins Coie opinion discusses First Amendment retaliation; the WilmerHale opinion expressly holds the challenged order unconstitutional. [S20–S23]

### Principal counterarguments and legal limits

The administration cited national security, clearance authority, contracting interests and alleged law-firm misconduct. District judgments do not establish impeachment automatically. This report does not represent the appellate posture as complete without a separate current docket audit.

### Records still needed

- Complete appellate dockets, stays, and final judgments as of publication.
- Any continued implementation or replacement orders after the injunctions.
- Relevant statements by President and agencies establishing motive or proffered justifications.

**ASSESSMENT** Direct signed orders and adverse district court judgments provide strong documentary and adjudicated grounds; appellate status requires final docket confirmation.

**Principal sources** S20 · S21 · S22 · S23

## § 3.2 Retaliation against attorneys associated with presidential investigations

**CHARGE** The President signed a memorandum singling out Covington & Burling attorneys involved with former Special Counsel Jack Smith.

### Fact-by-fact evidence ledger

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| Feb. 25 memorandum directs clearance suspensions/reviews concerning Peter Koski and other Covington lawyers who aided Smith. | DOCUMENTED | [S24] |
| The memorandum also directs termination of some federal engagements and review of firm contracts to extent permitted by law. | DOCUMENTED | [S24] |
| Every identified clearance was revoked and specific contracts were canceled solely for protected speech. | CONTESTED | No implementation file compiled |
| The memorandum was intended to punish lawful representation as such. | CONTESTED | Motive and legitimate security basis disputed |

### Presidential responsibility and legal theory

Unlike a subordinate-only episode, this memorandum is a direct presidential communication, naming lawyers by association with a prosecutor who had investigated Trump. Its text is sufficient to document presidential direction; whether that direction was punitive and unconstitutional requires further proof and legal evaluation. [S24]

### Principal counterarguments and legal limits

The administration asserted concerns about “weaponization” and directed actions consistent with applicable law. It may argue security reviews and lawful contracting judgments fall within executive responsibilities. No merits judgment about this particular memorandum is included in the presently verified record.

### Records still needed

- Agency-level compliance/implementation records and specific affected contracts.
- Security determinations, procedures, appeal rights, and contemporaneous reasons.
- Any lawsuits, rulings, or settlements involving the Covington memorandum.

**ASSESSMENT** Presidential direction is firmly documented; retaliatory motive, effects, and legal invalidity remain to be proved.

**Principal sources** S24

## § 3.3 Unlawful removal of independent government watchdogs

**CHARGE** President Trump removed inspectors general without complying with advance notice and case-specific explanation requirements.

### Fact-by-fact evidence ledger

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| Numerous inspectors general were dismissed Jan. 24, 2025 without the required prior congressional notice. | DOCUMENTED | [S25] |
| Judge Reyes found President Trump violated the Inspector General Act's notice requirements. | ADJUDICATED | [S25] |
| The court declined the requested reinstatement/injunctive remedy and stayed the matter. | ADJUDICATED | [S25] |
| Each removal was aimed at impeding a particular investigation. | CONTESTED | No such individual proof compiled |

### Presidential responsibility and legal theory

The legal connection to the President is direct: the court identifies his removals and statutory notice violation. The statutory requirement concerns 30-day notice with substantive case-specific reasons, subject to the precise provisions and constitutional dispute detailed in the opinion. [S25]

### Principal counterarguments and legal limits

The President asserted Article II removal authority and disputed the statute's constitutionality and remedy. Judge Reyes found a violation but declined reinstatement; that important distinction must appear alongside the finding. The decision does not independently establish a purpose to obstruct particular oversight investigations.

### Records still needed

- Individual dismissal communications and the notices actually sent to Congress.
- Any subsequent notices and remedies or appellate dispositions.
- Evidence bearing on motive beyond the documented failure to follow notice requirements.

**ASSESSMENT** Direct presidential action and judicial finding of statutory violation are adjudicated/documented; deliberate interference with particular investigations is unproven.

**Principal sources** S25

# PART V / ARTICLE IV — PRIVATE ADVANTAGE AND FOREIGN-LINKED FINANCE

## § 4.1 Commercialization of presidential access through cryptocurrency

**CHARGE** Access to the sitting President was marketed to top holders of a private crypto asset associated with his business interests.

### Fact-by-fact evidence ledger

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| Organizers announced Apr. 23 that 220 top qualifying $TRUMP holders could attend a presidential dinner. | DOCUMENTED—REPORTED | [S26] |
| Trump attended May 22 event at his Virginia golf club with token holders. | DOCUMENTED—REPORTED | [S27] |
| Business-controlled asset interests and transaction fees created possible private gains from buying/holding the token. | DOCUMENTED—REPORTED | [S27] |
| President exchanged a specific government act for a particular buyer's payment. | CONTESTED | No quid pro quo established |

### Presidential responsibility and legal theory

Presidential attendance and use of his status were material inducements in contemporaneous promotions. Published reporting supports an economic connection to Trump-associated entities, but a corporate benefit must not be automatically described as personal cash received by the President. A targeted congressional document request could resolve ownership and proceeds. [S26–S27]

### Principal counterarguments and legal limits

The event was described as private; the White House contended that the President attended in a personal capacity and business interests were separately managed. Mere attendance and private token ownership do not establish bribery or illegality. The concern is commercialization of presidential access and a potential conflict with public duties.

### Records still needed

- Original promotional terms and preserved ranking methodology.
- Token beneficial ownership, distributions, and recipient ledgers.
- Attendee identities where lawfully obtainable and any contemporaneous requests for official favors.
- Financial disclosures and relevant ethics-law analysis.

**ASSESSMENT** Promotion and presidential attendance are documented. Specific improper exchange and personal enrichment amounts remain unproven.

**Principal sources** S26 · S27

## § 4.2 Private financial relationships with foreign government-connected investors

**CHARGE** The President maintained family-associated private financial interests involving foreign government-connected investors while making official decisions affecting the UAE.

### Fact-by-fact evidence ledger

| FACT / PROPOSITION | STATUS | SUPPORT |
|---|---|---|
| WSJ reported a Jan. 16, 2025 agreement for a UAE-backed vehicle to acquire 49% of World Liberty for $500m. | DOCUMENTED—REPORTED | [S28] [S29] |
| WSJ reported $250m initial installment, approximately $187m directed to Trump-family entities and at least $31m to Witkoff-related entities. | DOCUMENTED—REPORTED | [S28] [S29] |
| World Liberty said USD1 was selected in May 1, 2025 $2bn MGX/Binance investment; fee economics not established. | DOCUMENTED—REPORTED | [S30] |
| Commerce announced U.S.–UAE AI partnership framework May 15, 2025. | DOCUMENTED | [S31] |
| President approved the AI agreement in return for investment or personally received a prohibited foreign emolument. | CONTESTED | No direct bargain or personal recipient evidence |

### Presidential responsibility and legal theory

The investment agreement precedes inauguration and is reported principally by WSJ, not authenticated in this report by an executed contract. The May 15 official framework is separately documented. The sequence creates serious appearance and conflict-of-interest questions; it cannot independently show causation. For this report, "Trump family-controlled entities" is not synonymous with Donald Trump personally. [S28–S31]

### Principal counterarguments and legal limits

Investor and administration may argue arm's-length preinauguration investment, independent technology-policy reasons, private management of interests, and absence of official quid pro quo. Use of USD1 in MGX/Binance is not proof that World Liberty received a fee, much less a direct payment to the President. A foreign emoluments claim would require a separate recipient/source/legal analysis.

### Records still needed

- Executed agreement, cap tables, distributions, beneficial ownership and payment records.
- Disclosure/recusal files and relevant ethics advice.
- Records of presidential participation in AI-chip and UAE framework decisions.
- Internal communications between officials, investors and intermediaries.
- USD1 fee/revenue documentation and a separate foreign-emoluments legal memorandum.

**ASSESSMENT** Major transaction details are credibly reported and official U.S.–UAE framework is documented; corrupt influence, quid pro quo, and personal emolument are not established.

**Principal sources** S28 · S29 · S30 · S31

# PART VI / FINDINGS AND EVIDENTIARY LIMITS

## A. What this record establishes

It establishes court findings of agency contempt, Supreme Court determinations about removal procedure, four official GAO impoundment determinations, congressional votes expressly opposing unauthorized Iran hostilities, multiple presidential orders and memoranda targeted at legal institutions, a judicial finding of an Inspector General Act notice violation, a publicized presidential crypto-access event, and substantial reported foreign-linked business relationships.

## B. What this record does not establish

It does not establish that a court found President Trump personally in contempt in J.O.P.; that every removal was personally directed by him; that GAO concluded he personally intended illegal impoundment; that a concurrent war-powers resolution is unambiguously binding after Chadha; that each targeted-law-firm judgment has survived every appeal; or that the UAE-related sequence proves bribery, influence-peddling, or a personal constitutional emolument.

## C. Priority evidence requests

- White House/DHS notice trail for J.O.P. between Aug. 6 and Sept. 1, 2026.
- OMB and agency communications showing knowledge of GAO warnings and funding-withholding instructions.
- Complete War Powers notices, legal memoranda and operations chronology.
- Current appellate docket status for law-firm injunctions and IG removal litigation.
- Crypto beneficial ownership, payment distributions, stablecoin fees, and UAE policy-decision communications.

## D. Bottom-line finding

The record provides a serious, reviewable basis for congressional inquiry into the nine proposed charges; several contain adjudicated legal violations or direct presidential instruments. It is not a finding that all nine charges are proved. An impeachment vote is the House's constitutional judgment after assessment of all evidence and defenses.

# APPENDIX A / MASTER CHRONOLOGY

| DATE | EVENT | § | SOURCE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan. 16, 2025 | Reported World Liberty agreement signed (preinauguration) | 4.2 | S28 |
| Jan. 20, 2025 | Trump assumes office; report evidence period begins | All | — |
| Jan. 24, 2025 | Inspector general dismissals | 3.3 | S25 |
| Feb. 11, 2025 | Executive Order 14210 | 2.1 | S09 |
| Feb. 25, 2025 | Covington & Burling memorandum | 3.2 | S24 |
| Mar. 6, 2025 | Executive Order 14230 (Perkins Coie) | 3.1 | S20 |
| Mar. 14, 2025 | Proclamation 10903 and Executive Order 14238 | 1.2 / 2.1 | S07 S10 |
| Mar. 27, 2025 | Executive Order 14250 (WilmerHale) | 3.1 | S22 |
| Apr. 10, 2025 | Supreme Court order, Noem v. Abrego Garcia | 1.2 | S06 |
| Apr. 23, 2025 | Crypto dinner promotion publicized | 4.1 | S26 |
| May 1, 2025 | USD1 reportedly selected for MGX investment | 4.2 | S30 |
| May 2, 2025 | Perkins Coie judgment | 3.1 | S21 |
| May 15, 2025 | Commerce announcement, UAE AI framework | 4.2 | S31 |
| May 16, 2025 | Supreme Court A.A.R.P. interim order | 1.2 | S08 |
| May 22, 2025 | Trump token-holder dinner | 4.1 | S27 |
| May 27, 2025 | WilmerHale judgment | 3.1 | S23 |
| June 16, 2025 | GAO B-337375, IMLS | 2.1 | S11 |
| Aug. 5, 2025 | GAO B-337203, NIH | 2.1 | S12 |
| Sept. 24, 2025 | Storch judgment on IG notice | 3.3 | S25 |
| Jan. 31, 2026 | WSJ publishes World Liberty investigation online | 4.2 | S28 |
| Feb. 28, 2026 | U.S./Israeli strikes begin Iran conflict | 2.2 | S18 |
| June 3, 2026 | House H. Con. Res. 86 vote, 215–208 | 2.2 | S15 |
| June 23, 2026 | Senate H. Con. Res. 86 vote, 50–48 | 2.2 | S17 |
| July 29, 2026 | Gallagher signs J.O.P. contempt memorandum | 1.1 | S02 |
| Aug. 6, 2026 | J.O.P. opinion publicly filed; Law360 coverage | 1.1 | S02 S03 |
| Sept. 1, 2026 | E.L.A. removed to El Salvador | 1.1 | S04 |
| Sept. 18, 2026 | CRS Iran conflict update | 2.2 | S18 |
| Sept. 25, 2026 | Second J.O.P. contempt order | 1.1 | S04 |
| Oct. 7, 2026 | GAO EPA and AHRQ decisions | 2.1 | S13 S14 |
| Nov. 3, 2026 | J.O.P. extension opinion | 1.1 | S05 |
| Nov. 4, 2026 | Public report cutoff date | All | — |

# APPENDIX B / MASTER SOURCE INDEX

Source identifiers in the nine evidence ledgers refer to the records below. Links point to the named public document or published article; third-party pages may change or be paywalled. A reachable link does not authenticate underlying nonpublic corporate documents or resolve litigation status.

**[S01] House Judiciary Committee Nixon impeachment articles**
July 27, 1974 | Historical constitutional precedent | Charge I / methodology
Open source · https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/articles-impeachment-adopted-the-house-representatives-committee-the-judiciary

**[S02] J.O.P. v. DHS, memorandum opinion, ECF 645 (signed July 29; publicly filed Aug. 6)**
Aug. 6, 2026 | District court opinion | Charge 1.1
Open source · https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/maryland/mddce/8:2019cv01944/457483/645/

**[S03] Law360: DHS, ICE held in contempt over asylum-seeker deportations**
Aug. 6, 2026 | Contemporaneous reporting | Charge 1.1
Open source · https://www.law360.com/access-to-justice/articles/2510799

**[S04] ABC News: Judge finds administration in contempt in E.L.A. removal**
Sept. 25, 2026 | Contemporaneous court reporting | Charge 1.1
Open source · https://abcnews.com/amp/US/judge-finds-trump-administration-contempt-deporting-asylum-seeker/story?id=136765172

**[S05] J.O.P. v. DHS, memorandum opinion, ECF 767 (settlement enforcement extension)**
Nov. 3, 2026 | District court opinion | Charge 1.1
Open source · https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/maryland/mddce/8:2019cv01944/457483/767/

**[S06] Noem v. Abrego Garcia, Supreme Court emergency order, 24A949**
Apr. 10, 2025 | Supreme Court order | Charge 1.2
Open source · https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a949_lkhn.pdf

**[S07] Proclamation 10903, Invocation of Alien Enemies Act**
Mar. 14, 2025 | Official presidential instrument | Charge 1.2
Open source · https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500357/html/DCPD-202500357.htm

**[S08] A.A.R.P. v. Trump, Supreme Court per curiam, 24A1007**
May 16, 2025 | Supreme Court order | Charge 1.2
Open source · https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/24A1007

**[S09] Executive Order 14210, workforce optimization**
Feb. 11, 2025 | Official presidential instrument | Charge 2.1
Open source · https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/implementing-the-presidents-department-of-government-efficiency-workforce-optimization-initiative/

**[S10] Executive Order 14238, reduction of federal bureaucracy**
Mar. 14, 2025 | Official presidential instrument | Charge 2.1
Open source · https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/continuing-the-reduction-of-the-federal-bureaucracy/

**[S11] GAO B-337375, Institute of Museum and Library Services**
June 16, 2025 | GAO legal decision | Charge 2.1
Open source · https://www.gao.gov/products/b-337375

**[S12] GAO B-337203, National Institutes of Health**
Aug. 5, 2025 | GAO legal decision | Charge 2.1
Open source · https://www.gao.gov/products/b-337203

**[S13] GAO B-337485, EPA Community Change Grants**
Oct. 7, 2026 | GAO legal decision | Charge 2.1
Open source · https://www.gao.gov/products/b-337485

**[S14] GAO B-337872, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality**
Oct. 7, 2026 | GAO legal decision | Charge 2.1
Open source · https://www.gao.gov/products/b-337872

**[S15] House Roll Call 199 on H. Con. Res. 86**
June 3, 2026 | Official congressional vote | Charge 2.2
Open source · https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2026/roll199

**[S16] H. Con. Res. 86, enrolled concurrent resolution**
June 23, 2026 | Official congressional measure | Charge 2.2
Open source · https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/BILLS-119hconres86enr

**[S17] Senate Congressional Record, H. Con. Res. 86, Roll 184**
June 23, 2026 | Official congressional vote | Charge 2.2
Open source · https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2026-06-23/html/CREC-2026-06-23-pt1-PgS3039-7.htm

**[S18] CRS report R48887, U.S. Conflict with Iran**
Sept. 18, 2026 | Congressional research report (mirror) | Charge 2.2
Open source · https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R48887.html

**[S19] War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §1544**
Statute | Statutory text | Charge 2.2
Open source · https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1544

**[S20] Executive Order 14230, Perkins Coie**
Mar. 6, 2025 | Official presidential instrument | Charge 3.1
Open source · https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/addressing-risks-from-perkins-coie-llp/

**[S21] Perkins Coie LLP v. DOJ, memorandum opinion, ECF 185**
May 2, 2025 | District court opinion | Charge 3.1
Open source · https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2025cv00716/278290/185/

**[S22] Executive Order 14250, WilmerHale**
Mar. 27, 2025 | Official presidential instrument | Charge 3.1
Open source · https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/addressing-risks-from-wilmerhale/

**[S23] WilmerHale v. Executive Office of the President, memorandum opinion**
May 27, 2025 | District court opinion | Charge 3.1
Open source · https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2025cv00917/278933/110/

**[S24] Presidential memorandum on Covington & Burling clearances and contracts**
Feb. 25, 2025 | Official presidential instrument | Charge 3.2
Open source · https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/suspension-of-security-clearances-and-evaluation-of-government-contracts/

**[S25] Storch v. Hegseth, memorandum opinion, ECF 54**
Sept. 24, 2025 | District court opinion | Charge 3.3
Open source · https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2025cv00415/277385/54

**[S26] Reuters: $TRUMP dinner offer to top 220 holders**
Apr. 23, 2025 | Contemporaneous reporting | Charge 4.1
Open source · https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/dinner-with-the-president-trump-meme-coin-surges-on-offer-to-top-buyers-4000208

**[S27] Associated Press: Trump hosts top cryptocurrency investors**
May 22, 2025 | Contemporaneous reporting | Charge 4.1
Open source · https://apnews.com/article/0e2d7ca5170bf594d44a391884ec52b3

**[S28] Wall Street Journal: Abu Dhabi-linked stake in World Liberty**
Jan. 31, 2026 (online) | Investigative reporting | Charge 4.2
Open source · https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/spy-sheikh-secret-stake-trump-crypto-tahnoon-ea4d97e8

**[S29] The Block: transaction summary and reported proceeds**
Feb. 1, 2026 | Corroborating financial reporting | Charge 4.2
Open source · https://www.theblock.co/news/deals/2026-02-01-uae-sheikh-secretly-acquired-49-of-trumps-world-liberty-financial-days-before-inauguration-wsj-387931

**[S30] Reuters: USD1 stablecoin selected for MGX–Binance investment**
May 1, 2025 | Contemporaneous reporting | Charge 4.2
Open source · https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/wlfs-zach-witkoff-usd1-selected-official-stablecoin-mgx-investment-binance-2025-05-01/

**[S31] Commerce Department: UAE/US advanced technology framework**
May 15, 2025 | Official executive-branch release | Charge 4.2
Open source · https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2025/05/uae/us-framework-advanced-technology-cooperation

**[S32] Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse: J.O.P. docket history**
Updated 2026 | Court-docket research index | Charge 1.1
Open source · https://clearinghouse.net/case/17250/

# APPENDIX C / CASE AND DECISION INDEX

| MATTER | DOCKET / DECISION | FINDING RELEVANT HERE | SOURCE |
|---|---|---|---|
| J.O.P. v. DHS | D. Md. 8:19-cv-01944; ECF 645; Sept. 25 order; ECF 767 | Agency contempt; later second contempt; Nov. 3 extension | S02 S04 S05 |
| Noem v. Abrego Garcia | Supreme Court 24A949 | Government must facilitate release; remedy limits | S06 |
| A.A.R.P. v. Trump | Supreme Court 24A1007 | ~24 h notice without review instructions inadequate; merits reserved | S08 |
| Perkins Coie v. DOJ | D.D.C. 25-cv-716; ECF 185 | EO 14230 unconstitutional; district relief | S21 |
| WilmerHale v. EOP | D.D.C. 25-cv-917 | EO 14250 unconstitutional; district relief | S23 |
| Storch v. Hegseth | D.D.C. 25-cv-415; ECF 54 | Trump violated IG notice statute; reinstatement denied | S25 |
| GAO: IMLS / NIH / EPA / AHRQ | B-337375 / B-337203 / B-337485 / B-337872 | Administrative legal determinations; not court cases | S11–S14 |

## APPENDIX D / ARTICLE-TO-EVIDENCE CROSS-REFERENCE

| CHARGE | STRONGEST RECORD | PRESIDENTIAL LINK | CRITICAL OPEN ISSUE |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | J.O.P. 2026 contempt rulings; Aug. coverage | Executive supervision / reason-to-know allegation | Notice to Trump or close senior officers and response |
| 1.2 | Proclamation 10903; Supreme Court removal orders | Signed presidential proclamation | Directive/knowledge of specific unlawful implementation |
| 2.1 | Four GAO ICA decisions; two executive orders | EOs directed relevant restructuring | White House intent / post-warning instructions |
| 2.2 | H. Con. Res. 86; CRS conflict history | Commander-in-Chief direction of hostilities | Statutory 60-day clock, authority and Chadha |
| 3.1 | Signed EOs; two adverse district judgments | Direct signed instruments | Appellate/postjudgment status |
| 3.2 | Feb. 25 Covington presidential memo | Direct signed memorandum | Actual actions and constitutional motive |
| 3.3 | Storch ECF 54 | Direct presidential removals | Remedies, later rulings and asserted removal powers |
| 4.1 | Dinner promotion; presidential attendance | Personal participation | Ownership/proceeds, specific exchanges |
| 4.2 | WSJ transaction; Commerce framework | Family interests and presidential official role | Corrupt link, personal benefit, transaction details |

## APPENDIX E / RECORD PRESERVATION AND PUBLICATION PROTOCOL

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- When adding facts after Nov. 4, 2026, issue a dated new edition and revision log rather than silently altering the original snapshot.
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### REPORT CONCLUSION

These materials warrant serious, independent evaluation by the House of Representatives. They do not compel a predetermined outcome. The constitutional inquiry is whether established conduct, reasonably attributed to the President on a sufficient evidentiary basis, constitutes high crimes or misdemeanors warranting impeachment. The report supplies the documentary record, records the substantial contrary arguments, and identifies what further evidence a fair inquiry would need.

END OF REPORT / November 4, 2026